AbstractOver the past two decades, China’s wind power industry has completed a historic leap from technology adoption to global leadership. By the end of 2024, China’s cumulative wind power capacity reached 521 GW, accounting for 45.8% of the global total, while its newly installed capacity in 2024 represented 68.2% of the global market. This article systematically analyzes the "triple drivers" of China's success: strategic continuity and institutional guarantees, comprehensive industrial chain synergy and economies of scale, and financial innovation and risk management. It further examines Europe’s energy transition challenges and the potential for cooperation with China. The article argues that while seeking cooperation, Europe should critically analyze China’s institutional experience in renewable energy governance—specifically the legal status of "overriding public interest," the mechanism of total capacity targets with periodic revisions, and the path of market-oriented reform. These institutional lessons should not be "transplanted" simplistically but rather adapted within Europe’s existing legal traditions to realize the strategic objective of "borrowing China's wind to set Europe's sails."
I. Introduction: From "Wind Chaser" to "Global Leader"
In September 2025, at the UN Climate Change Summit, China announced its new Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs): by 2035, the total installed capacity of wind and solar power will be more than six times that of 2020, aiming for 3.6 TW. Behind this declaration lies a startling reality: in 2024, nearly two out of every three new wind turbines installed globally were in China; China’s wind capacity surged from 340 MW in 2000 to 521 GW in 2024, a growth of over 1,500 times.
As a European economic scholar long focused on energy transition, I must admit: while Europe is still hindered by lengthy approval processes, grid connection delays, and high supply chain costs, China has built the world’s largest and most complete renewable energy supply chain. In regions with favorable wind resources, China’s levelized cost of electricity (LCOE) has dropped to 0.1–0.15 RMB/kWh, making it the most competitive power source.
However, the logic behind these figures deserves deeper scrutiny. China's success cannot be summarized by mere "scale expansion" or "low-price competition." It reflects an industrial policy paradigm tightly coupled with national governance—a paradigm with unique advantages and complex costs. For a Europe currently facing dual anxiety regarding energy security and industrial competitiveness, understanding these Chinese experiences and prudently drawing upon transferable institutional elements, while remaining vigilant against the risks of blind transplantation, may be a rational path toward strategic energy autonomy.
II. Key Factors Behind China’s Wind Power Success
2.1 Strategic Continuity and Institutional Guarantees
The most impressive feature of China’s wind industry is its strategic continuity spanning decades. Unlike European renewable policies that often fluctuate with electoral cycles and geopolitical winds, China has prioritized renewable energy at the core of its national strategy since the enactment of the Renewable Energy Law in 2006.
The legislation opted for a "mandatory full purchase" arrangement, requiring grid enterprises to absorb all renewable energy power—a strategy that, despite later challenges, provided a stable market outlet. With the 2025 Energy Law further clarifying that "the state supports the priority development and utilization of renewable energy," this status has been elevated from departmental policy to national law. This combination of "legislative priority, planning guidance, and supporting policies" allows Chinese firms to make long-term investment decisions with predictable expectations—a factor currently lacking for European developers.
2.2 Industrial Chain Synergy and Economies of Scale
China has built the world’s largest and most complete wind power supply chain, with Chinese-manufactured turbines and key components accounting for over 70% of the global market. This cluster effect accelerates technical iteration. In October 2024, the world’s largest 26 MW offshore wind turbine was rolled out by Dongfang Electric in Fujian. This innovation is driven by a feedback loop of "installation—learning—cost reduction—re-installation," supported by a massive domestic market that offers a "learning ground" unattainable for European peers.
2.3 Financial Innovation and Risk Management
The capital-intensive nature of wind power is supported by a robust financial ecosystem. Innovation ranges from long-term low-interest loans from policy banks to the establishment of multi-billion yuan industrial development funds (e.g., in Yangjiang). Furthermore, breakthroughs in green finance—such as carbon-reduction re-lending tools and insurance products like the national first "all-risk construction insurance for offshore wind"—have lowered financial hurdles, with rates for some projects reaching as low as 3%.
III. Europe’s Dilemma and Opportunities for China
3.1 Structural Contradictions in Europe
Europe faces a widening gap between ambitious targets and sluggish execution. To meet the 2030 target of 42.5% renewable energy, the EU requires an annual addition of 36 GW of wind capacity, yet only 12.9 GW was added in 2024. The core obstacles include bureaucratic approval processes, grid bottlenecks, and supply chain fragility. As noted by energy expert Andreas Goldthau (侯安德), the lack of sustained demand has left Europe’s supply chain underutilized, preventing the learning curve benefits seen in China.
3.2 The Paradox of Cooperation
China’s wind equipment exports grew by over 70% in 2024, with Chinese manufacturers claiming the top three global spots. Despite this, firms like Mingyang Smart have faced "political resistance," such as the cancellation of contracts in Germany, while simultaneously pursuing "localized" partnerships in the UK, such as with Octopus Energy. The core challenge is "institutional trust"—European banks often require higher risk premiums for projects using Chinese equipment, offsetting initial cost savings.
IV. Institutional Lessons for Europe
4.1 Legal Status of "Overriding Public Interest"
Europe should consider embedding an "Overriding Public Interest" clause into the Renewable Energy Directive (RED III) revisions, ensuring that renewable energy projects take priority in land-use and planning disputes, provided they meet rigorous environmental assessments.
4.2 Periodic Revision Mechanism
Following the German experience of adjusting the EEG legislation, Europe should establish a legally binding review mechanism for national renewable energy action plans, empowering the European Commission to implement corrective measures if member states deviate significantly from targets.
4.3 Gradual Market-Oriented Reform
China’s approach of differentiating support policies based on technology maturity—such as the recent end of tax rebates for mature onshore wind while maintaining support for offshore innovation—offers a model for Europe to avoid the "abrupt withdrawal" of subsidies that has previously destabilized its markets.
V. Conclusion: Borrowing China’s Wind to Set Europe’s Sails
China’s success proves that energy transition is not merely a technical challenge but an institutional one. For Europe, China is a competitor, a partner, and a mirror. The strategy of "soft-hardware separation"—as seen in the UK-Mingyang model—provides a blueprint for risk-controlled cooperation. By absorbing the institutional wisdom of China—such as prioritized legal status, adaptive governance, and graduated policy exits—Europe can refine its own transition path. As Luis Neves (Global Sustainable Development Enabling Initiative) aptly noted, "Europe's zero-carbon dream needs China's wisdom." By integrating these institutional insights, Europe can bridge its governance gaps and accelerate its transition, turning competitive pressure into a powerful driver for its own energy evolution.
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