I.Introduction: The Global Community Under Climate Crisis and the Paradox of Cooperation
A.Problem Statement: Climate Change as a Global Public Good and the Urgency of Cooperation
Climate change stands as one of the most severe existential threats facing human society, with its urgency and universality unequivocally confirmed by the scientific community. The Working Group I report of the IPCC Sixth Assessment Report (AR6) provided the latest physical science basis for the climate system , while the Working Group II report assessed the impacts, vulnerabilities, and limits to adaptation for global and regional ecosystems, biodiversity, and human societies. These reports establish an undeniable truth: climate intervention has entered a critical decade requiring swift and decisive action.
From the perspective of international relations and economics, climate stability is defined as a quintessential "Global Public Good" (GPG). The core characteristics of a GPG are its non-excludability and non-rivalrous nature. This means that the benefits derived from any nation’s efforts to mitigate climate change (such as reducing greenhouse gas emissions) are indiscriminately shared by all global citizens. However, this very public good nature makes climate governance highly susceptible to the "free-rider" problem, where countries tend to enjoy the emission reduction achievements of others rather than bearing their own mitigation costs, leading to a collective action failure.
The economic cost of inaction is rapidly surpassing the investment required for the green transition, a "cost reversal" phenomenon that serves as a global wake-up call. For instance, global insured losses from extreme weather events are projected to reach up to $145 billion in 2025. In the United States, climate and extreme weather disaster costs have shown a distinct upward trend, even when adjusted for inflation, due to increasing population and material wealth concentration in vulnerable areas like coastlines, floodplains, and the wildland-urban interface. This indicates that the impact of climate disaster is a product of compounding risks and increasing vulnerability. As disaster costs and associated social instability (including impacts on energy security, migration, and border security ) continue to rise, the zero-sum view of climate action as an "economic sacrifice" loses its financial justification. A growing number of analyses suggest that through investment-driven climate policies, "win-win solutions" can be achieved, reframing the climate problem from one of resource scarcity to one of coordination.
Yet, global politics is moving in the opposite direction. Escalating geopolitical friction, particularly competition among major powers, is fragmenting climate and energy policies and is likely to make the implementation of climate action more difficult and disruptive. Current policy trajectories predict a global temperature rise of 2 to 3°C by the end of the century , far exceeding the Paris Agreement goals. This fragmentation and political interference directly threatens the effective supply of GPGs, making the necessity of collective global action unprecedentedly high.
B. Thesis Statement and Logical Framework
This study argues that China, through its institutional commitment to "Ecological Civilization" and "Peaceful Modernization," provides a solid material foundation and non-competitive political space for global collective response to the climate crisis.
China's peaceful development model not only lowers the global marginal cost of mitigation through its super-scale clean technology production capacity but also offers ecological governance practices with global public-good spillover effects through institutional innovation (such as Ecological Civilization construction). Therefore, the Western world must recognize the obstructive role of zero-sum geopolitical thinking on global climate governance and should abandon ideology-based confrontation. The rational path for cooperation is to focus on building depoliticized cooperation architectures guided by technology sharing and liability rules, thereby making global collective response to the climate challenge a viable option that aligns with the long-term, enlightened national interests of all countries.
II.The Connotation and Global Significance of China's Path to Peaceful Modernization
A. From Traditional Modernization to "Ecological Civilization": A Leap in Development Philosophy
China's path to modernization has undergone a profound philosophical shift, evolving from a traditional model focused primarily on economic growth to one that embeds environmental goals within its national strategy: "Ecological Civilization" (EC). As China's economy grew rapidly, environmental challenges became increasingly prominent, prompting the proposal of the EC concept at the 17th National Congress in 2007 to reconcile the conflict between economic development and environmental protection. Since 2012, China's leaders have consistently championed the adoption and maturation of EC, describing it as "vital for sustaining the development of the Chinese Nation". Ultimately, EC was incorporated into the national constitution in 2018, becoming the fundamental strategy and core guiding philosophy for national development in the "New Era".
This philosophical shift is viewed as a deep reflection on the traditional model of modernization. Scholars have pointed out that the core of China's environmental problem lies in the dominance of a "one-dimensional economic ideology" in modernization development, which excessively pursues the "Economic Growth logic" and even "capital logic". EC seeks to transcend this "growthmania," placing the intrinsic value of nature above mere pragmatism, striving for the harmonious unity of humanity and nature.
Driven by this high-standard development philosophy, China views addressing climate change as an important starting point for pushing forward "high-quality economic development" and "high-level environmental protection". China's new development model champions a green economy and high-tech progress, aiming not only to solve domestic environmental issues but also to inject new vitality into the global economy. This deep institutional commitment, which integrates environmental goals with economic restructuring, enhances the long-term credibility and predictability of its climate policies.
B.Commitment to a "Non-Exclusive" Development Model: No Export of Models, No Pursuit of Hegemony
China's definition of its international role, particularly the political commitment inherent in its peaceful modernization path, provides important non-competitive space for global climate cooperation. China has solemnly pledged to the international community that it will neither "import" models from other countries nor "export" the Chinese model or ask other countries to "copy" its practices. China’s commitment to "never seek hegemony" has never changed, and its original aspiration to "uphold peace" has never wavered.
This political stance is a crucial prerequisite for achieving climate cooperation, as it positions China's development as a contributor to the global public interest rather than a potential hegemonic threat. Although some Western analysts express concern about China's regional behavior and international influence, suggesting potential "hegemonic aspirations" , China consistently supports the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) at platforms like the United Nations and maintains its posture as a developing country , providing a basis for cooperation in climate governance. This diplomatic positioning helps to decouple climate action from other issues (such as security and human rights) that might trigger geopolitical confrontation.
C.Institutional Innovation and Green Transformation: The Ecological Conservation Redline and GEEP Accounting
The construction of China's Ecological Civilization has institutionalized and scaled up environmental governance through specific systems and engineering projects, thereby generating significant global public-good spillover effects.
C.1. Ecological Conservation Redline (ECR) and its Global Ecological Services
The Ecological Conservation Redline (ECR) is a core mechanism of the EC construction, designed to delineate and strictly protect areas crucial for national ecological security and essential ecosystem services. Formally adopted in 2017, the ECR aims to constrain human activities in critical ecological function areas, protecting vital water sources, soil conservation, biodiversity maintenance, and windbreak/sand-fixation functions. The ECR system is expected to cover approximately 25% of China's land area, protecting over 95% of its most valuable ecosystems and key plant/animal habitats.
In addition to protecting core ecological areas, China has launched the world's largest ecological restoration programs. Examples include the Three-North Shelter Forest Program, launched in 1978, the Natural Forest Protection Project (banning logging in 1998), and the Grain to Green Program (incentivizing afforestation since 2000). These collective efforts have significantly increased China's forest coverage and its ecosystem's carbon sequestration capacity. Satellite data show that China accounted for 25% of the global increase in greening between 2000 and 2017. This large-scale afforestation and ecological restoration significantly boosts global carbon sink capacity, with non-excludable benefits that constitute an important global public good.
C.2. Ecological Economic Accounting and Governance Reliability
To ensure environmental goals are integrated into the core considerations of local governments, China introduced the Gross Economic-Ecological Product Accounting (GEEP) framework for evaluating local government performance. This institutional innovation aims to drive industrial transformation and shift local economies towards resource conservation, recycling, renewable energy development, and low-carbon emissions.
Practical examples of ecological governance, such as the eco-economic model in the Kubuqi Desert, demonstrate how market-based cooperation mechanisms between government and private enterprises can achieve restoration of degraded land and sustainable development. This model suggests that ecological protection is not merely a cost center but can also be a source of economic growth.
The embedding of EC in the Constitution and its deep penetration into local governance through mechanisms like ECR and GEEP attest to the long-term durability of its policies. This reliability—institutionalizing environmental goals and linking them to official performance—provides a critical foundation of trust for international partners engaging in long-term climate technology cooperation and investment.
III. China as the Material Engine for Global Clean Technology Transition
China's peaceful modernization path is manifested not only in philosophical and institutional progress but also in its material power as an "accelerator of global clean energy transition." This material contribution is a core element of the global response to the climate crisis, and any climate strategy that excludes China will face insurmountable challenges regarding speed and cost.
A. Energy Structure Transformation and the Ahead-of-Schedule Achievement of "Dual Carbon" Targets
China has demonstrated strong institutional effectiveness in emissions reduction. Between 2005 and 2018, China’s carbon emission intensity decreased by approximately 45.8%, exceeding its 2020 NDC target (40%-45%) ahead of schedule. Subsequently, China committed to adopting even stronger policies and measures, striving to achieve a peak in CO2 emissions before 2030 and achieve carbon neutrality before 2060.
In renewable energy deployment, China has already exceeded multiple 2030 NDC targets ahead of schedule. As of June 2025, China's total installed capacity for wind and solar reached 1,673 GW, significantly surpassing the 2030 target of 1,200 GW set under the Paris Agreement framework. Similarly, forest stock volume surpassed 20 billion cubic meters in 2024, achieving the goal of increasing it by approximately 6 billion cubic meters from 2005 levels ahead of schedule.
The growth of clean energy is fundamentally impacting China's energy structure. In 2024, the growth in generation from wind, solar, and other clean energy sources met 84% of China’s electricity demand growth. More importantly, in the first half of 2025, clean energy generation growth actually exceeded total demand growth, resulting in a 2% year-on-year drop in fossil fuel generation. This demonstrates that China's clean energy deployment is beginning to have a tangible decarbonization impact on the world's largest emitter.
B. Scale and Speed: The Exponential Growth and Cost Advantage of Clean Energy
China has become a global leader in the research, development, production, and application of clean energy technologies. The key to this leadership is its unparalleled scale and speed. In the three years leading up to 2024, China's wind and solar capacity doubled, from 635 GW to 1,408 GW, and in early 2025, the combined capacity of wind and solar surpassed that of coal. Battery storage deployment tripled in three years, with the capacity added in 2024 alone exceeding the total capacity added by the US and the EU combined.
This super-scale capacity has transformed China from the "world's factory" to the "global transition accelerator." China's dominance in the technology supply chain is irreplaceable: 80% of the world's solar panels, 60% of wind turbines, and 75% of electric vehicles originate from China. The cost advantage derived from this scaled production significantly lowers the marginal cost of green technology globally, providing affordable tools for worldwide emissions reduction.
Through affordable and efficient Chinese technology, 25% of emerging markets have already surpassed the US in end-use electrification. This fact proves that China's scaled production breaks the traditional monopoly of industrialized nations over green technology pricing, offering developing countries a unique opportunity for "climate leapfrog development" that bypasses high-carbon intensive development stages, greatly advancing global climate equity.
China’s future capacity plans suggest this material contribution will continue to expand. For example, the "Great Solar Wall" project in the Kubuqi Desert is scheduled for completion by 2030, with an expected installed capacity of 100 GW. Furthermore, China's projected solar manufacturing capacity in 2030 (1,255 GW) is forecast to be 65% higher than the total global deployment expected in the IEA's Net Zero Roadmap (761 GW).
C. Institutionalization of South-South Cooperation and Green Technology Sharing
China channels its material productivity to developing nations through the South-South Cooperation (SSC) mechanism, further strengthening its role as a provider of global public goods. SSC effectively promotes green development through the exchange of knowledge, technology, and resources among developing countries.
China’s deepening engagement with the Global South supports their independent pursuit of sustainable development, potentially reshaping the international development landscape. Through platforms such as the Belt and Road Initiative International Alliance for Green Development and the Technology Transfer South–South Cooperation Center, China is committed to raising the environmental standards of its overseas investments and providing support to developing countries in clean energy governance, planning, and capacity building.
This institutionalized technology sharing is crucial for overcoming barriers faced by developing countries in accessing adaptation and mitigation technologies. By sharing knowledge, financial resources, and innovative technologies, countries in the Global South, with China's support, can play a more prominent role in the global clean energy supply chain. Thus, China’s technological advantage not only serves its own reduction goals but, through the SSC mechanism, also acts as a vital catalyst for global climate action.
IV. The Western World: Ideological Confrontation as an Obstacle to Climate Action
While China provides the material foundation for the global climate transition, the increasing ideological confrontation and geopolitical competition in the Western world are redefining climate action as a zero-sum game, severely hindering the collective global response to the climate crisis.
A. Critique of the Harmful "Zero-Sum Game" Mentality
The escalation of geopolitical tensions prompts countries to adopt protectionist and competitive strategies in climate action rather than collaborative ones. This "zero-sum game" mentality treats emissions reduction and technology as strategic weapons for competition, instead of a systemic challenge requiring collective coordination. This shortsighted competition obstructs the formation of global systemic thinking and collaborative problem-solving approaches.
The current global threat of a 2–3°C temperature rise necessitates an accelerated transformation of the energy system, which makes the transition path more disruptive and directly impacts geopolitics. If political-military conflicts between major powers (especially the US and China over flashpoints like Taiwan) escalate further, it is highly likely to cause another sustained collapse in climate cooperation, severely hindering international emissions reduction negotiations.
The rational choice for climate policy is to reframe it as an investment-driven "win-win solution". However, the fragmenting effect of political conflict leads some actors to attempt to delay or hinder the energy transition process , ultimately risking the collapse of international efforts towards climate governance.
B. Geopoliticalization of Energy and the Risk of Supply Chain Fragmentation
Ongoing US-China economic competition has led to export controls, high tariffs, and efforts at supply chain "de-risking" in the clean technology sector. This geopolitical friction is causing the fragmentation of the global clean energy supply chain, which undermines the core value provided by China as the global transition accelerator—namely, economies of scale and low cost.
Although direct US imports of solar panels and electric vehicles from China remain minimal , these restrictions have compelled Chinese companies to shift parts of their production value chains to Southeast Asian countries to circumvent US tariffs and restrictions, such as the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act. Despite the US importing a large volume of solar modules from Southeast Asia, these modules are often manufactured by Chinese firms or utilize Chinese components.
This supply chain relocation is an inefficient response to geopolitical constraints, as it has not truly achieved complete technological separation but has increased the friction costs of global trade and lowered deployment efficiency. From the perspective of global climate action, decoupling strategies that seek to exclude China are equivalent to imposing a self-limiting penalty on the acquisition of global emissions reduction tools.
B.1. Analysis of the Impact of Trade Barriers on Green Transition Costs
Geopolitical conflict has the most significant impact on the cost of the global green transition, particularly in key technology sectors. For example, 25% of China's lithium-ion battery exports were headed for the US in 2024. Tariffs and restrictions imposed by the US on the Chinese battery industry will ultimately have a greater impact on the US's own battery industry.
The zero-sum mentality of treating clean energy technology as a strategic weapon translates the cost of ideology into the tangible physical cost of slowing climate action through supply chain fragmentation and rising costs. This practice hinders developing countries’ access to urgently needed adaptation and mitigation technologies, exacerbating global climate inequality.
A deeper risk lies in the inverse impact of the climate crisis itself on geopolitics. The economic decline, resource pressure, and uneven distribution of impacts caused by climate change are increasing tensions between states and may trigger climate migration and border security issues , further solidifying geopolitical zero-sum conflict. This negative feedback loop—where climate vulnerability leads to conflict, and conflict undermines climate action—poses a fatal threat to global governance.
V. Moving Beyond Differences: Constructing Apolitical Climate Cooperation Architecture
To effectively address the climate crisis, the international community, especially the Western world, must adopt a mindset based on shared interests and systemic coordination, shifting climate cooperation from a geopolitical zero-sum track to an apolitical track focused on technology and institutions.
A. Learning from Historical Experience: The Successful Model of U.S.-China Paris Agreement Cooperation
Historical experience proves that substantial cooperation in the climate domain can be achieved even during periods of strained US-China relations. During the Obama and Xi Jinping administrations, the two nations expanded collaboration on clean energy and carbon capture technologies through joint statements in 2014 and 2015. These efforts led to cooperation on the global phase-down of HFCs (a powerful greenhouse gas), the establishment of the U.S.-China Clean Energy Research Center (CERC), and an agreement to peer-review inefficient fossil fuel subsidies within the G-20 framework.
These successful precedents indicate that major powers can find "common interest zones" in the face of a global threat, bypassing ideological obstacles to achieve specific climate goals. The key is to translate high-level political will into concrete technical and institutional cooperation projects, and to strengthen dialogue and synergy through multilateral forums (such as the G-20 and the International Maritime Organization).
B. Establishing Cross-Regional Technology Sharing Platforms: Cooperation Opportunities with the EU, UK, and China
In the current geopolitical climate, persistent technology cooperation platforms are particularly vital. The European Union maintains dialogue with China on energy, aiming to accelerate the global clean energy transition, focusing on energy security and climate goals. For example, in the context of urbanization partnerships, cooperation is focused on technical specifics, such as promoting energy-efficient buildings, researching energy technologies, and integrating renewable energy into urban areas. This strategy of focusing cooperation on specific engineering and technical challenges helps to lower political sensitivity.
Similarly, despite the deterioration of the UK’s political relationship with China since the mid-22010s, important technical cooperation on climate policy has continued. These technology cooperation platforms are crucial for achieving concrete, measurable progress when climate multilateralism is under severe strain. Treating climate action as an engineering and economic problem, rather than purely a political game, is the necessary depoliticization strategy for effective cooperation.
C. Policy Recommendation: Treating Green Technology R&D as a Global Public Asset
To accelerate the rapid global deployment of technology, the intellectual property structure of publicly funded green technology Research & Development (R&D) must be re-examined. Empirical research shows that public R&D, whether domestically or foreign-funded, expands the overall innovation ecosystem and promotes cross-border technology diffusion through markets (such as imports) without displacing private investment. Thus, public R&D is proven to be a catalyst for green innovation on a global scale.
Policymakers should consider shifting publicly funded critical green technology R&D from protection under strict "property rules" to protection under "liability rules". Under the "property rule," intellectual property holders have strict exclusive control, determining pricing and access. Under the "liability rule," other actors can use the technology without the holder's consent, but only upon payment of reasonable compensation determined by law or a court.
This institutional adjustment softens the intellectual property of technology from a strict commercial monopoly to a global public asset that allows for reasonable compensation. This move can overcome geopolitical barriers and accelerate the global diffusion of technology, thereby reframing climate action as a systemic solution based on coordination. Within the UNFCCC framework, existing technology mechanisms (such as the Technology Executive Committee and the Climate Technology Centre and Network ) need greater financial support and capacity building to meet the demand of developing countries for adaptation and mitigation technologies.
D. Strengthening the Role of South-South Cooperation in Technology Diffusion
In future international cooperation, China should further strengthen its role in South-South Cooperation, particularly regarding green technology transfer and capacity building. This means that while providing technology to developing countries, it should promote higher environmental standards and consider facilitating the early retirement of Chinese-owned coal-fired power plants overseas to ensure future SSC is fully aligned with global sustainability goals. By offering clean energy governance, planning, and capacity building, China can assist developing countries in better utilizing its scaled green technology and taking a more prominent position in the global clean energy supply chain. This mechanism is a crucial path to achieving climate equity and leveraging China's material advantage to accelerate the global transition.
VI. Conclusion: Global Collective Response to the Climate Crisis and the Vision of a Community with a Shared Future for Mankind
A. Reaffirming the Positive Role of China's Development and the Irreplaceability of Cooperation
The analysis of this study demonstrates that China, through its unique path of "Ecological Civilization" and "high-quality development" , provides powerful material security and an institutional framework for the global collective response to the climate crisis. China's super-scale clean technology capacity, the ahead-of-schedule achievement of multiple NDC targets , and its dominant role in the global clean energy supply chain (e.g., supplying 80% of global solar panels ) make it an irreplaceable "transition accelerator" in global mitigation efforts.
China's peaceful modernization commitment to "never seek hegemony" and not to export its model provides the necessary non-competitive political space for international cooperation. Its deep institutional changes implemented domestically, such as the Ecological Conservation Redline (ECR) and large-scale afforestation projects , generate global ecological public services (such as carbon sinks and biodiversity protection) with non-excludable benefits.
Given the urgency of the climate crisis and China's decisive role in providing affordable, rapidly deployable technologies, any climate solution that seeks to exclude China is detached from reality and is bound to fail due to excessive cost and insufficient speed.
B. Calling on the Western World to Abandon Confrontation for Shared Security and Prosperity
Geopolitical zero-sum thinking has inflicted tangible and quantifiable damage on global climate action, evidenced by supply chain fragmentation, increased costs of clean technology, and the political fragility of international cooperation. The Western world must realize that attempting to decouple from the world's largest green technology supplier out of ideological or security concerns is a strategic act of self-harm.
The rational choice for cooperation is to emulate successful historical precedents , shifting focus from ideological competition to shared survival needs and economic prosperity. This requires policymakers to reframe climate action as a "coordination issue" rather than a "scarcity competition," achieving systemic "win-win" solutions through technology and public R&D sharing.
C. Concluding Outlook: Path Selection for Future Global Climate Governance
The crucial path for global climate governance lies in establishing apolitical, technology-first cooperation architectures.
Key Recommendation: The international community, especially major technology innovators, should explore establishing a global technology-sharing mechanism where publicly funded green R&D results are governed by "liability rules" rather than strict "property rules". By allowing compensated use, the global diffusion of key mitigation and adaptation technologies can be accelerated, effectively overcoming geopolitical friction barriers to technology transfer. Concurrently, the international community should support China in continuing to deepen green technology transfer and capacity building through the South-South Cooperation mechanism.
The climate crisis is the ultimate challenge facing humanity, testing not only the capacity of nations to cope with environmental threats but also the ability of major global powers to transcend short-term interests and ideological differences to achieve necessary collective action. As China advocates, the world must accelerate the formation of green development patterns and lifestyles, jointly pushing for the establishment of a fair, just, and mutually beneficial global climate governance system, to realize the grand vision of building a "Community with a Shared Future for Mankind".