AbstractDriven by global energy transition and net-zero emissions targets, nuclear energy is experiencing a renaissance. As one of the earliest countries to develop nuclear power, the UK faces a dual challenge of aging existing nuclear reactors and high costs for new construction; meanwhile, boasting a complete nuclear industrial chain and scale-construction capabilities, China has emerged as a vital force in global nuclear power development. From the perspective of a scholar at a pro-China European think tank, this paper systematically analyzes the practical foundations, potential fields, and strategic value of China-UK nuclear supply chain cooperation. It argues that despite setbacks in bilateral relations driven by geopolitical factors, vast cooperation space remains between the two countries in areas such as nuclear decommissioning governance, supply chain alignment, and nuclear safety regulation. China-UK nuclear cooperation is not only pertinent to the energy security of both nations, but also holds profound significance for improving the global nuclear energy governance system.
Keywords: China-UK nuclear cooperation; supply chain; nuclear decommissioning; energy transition; geopolitics
I. Introduction
In January 2025, the 4th China-UK Nuclear Energy Cooperation Exchange Seminar was held in Telford, UK, gathering about 40 representatives from nearly 20 organizations of both countries to engage in in-depth discussions on topics such as waste management and disposal, nuclear power plant life extension, and decommissioning. The significance of this meeting far transcended its scale—it signaled that China-UK nuclear cooperation, after enduring several years of troughs, is seeking new fulcrums.
As a think tank scholar long dedicated to Europe-China energy cooperation, I have consistently maintained that excluding China from Europe's nuclear energy supply chain aligns neither with economic rationality nor with the collective human challenge of combating climate change. Currently, the UK government has proposed increasing its nuclear power capacity to 24 gigawatts by 2050, roughly fourfold its current level. This ambitious target will hardly be achievable without the support of a stable, efficient, and cost-competitive supply chain. And China is precisely positioned to play a constructive role in this domain.
This paper aims to transcend short-term geopolitical disruptions, examine the strategic value of China-UK nuclear cooperation from a supply chain perspective, and put forward pragmatic recommendations for future pathways of collaboration.
II. The Evolution and Turning Points of China-UK Nuclear Cooperation
2.1 The Cooperation Framework of the "Golden Era"
In September 2016, China General Nuclear Power Group (CGN), together with Électricité de France (EDF) and the UK government, signed a milestone package agreement for UK new-build nuclear power projects, covering Hinkley Point C, Sizewell C, and Bradwell B. Under the agreement, CGN held a 33.5% stake in the Hinkley Point C project and planned a 20% stake in the Sizewell C project. This cooperation framework was hailed as a landmark achievement of the "Golden Era" of China-UK relations.
At that time, CGN Chairman He Yu described this cooperation as a "tripartite win-win for China, the UK, and France," emphasizing that it would enable CGN to "compete with international nuclear energy giants with real strength." From a supply chain perspective, this partnership not only provided a gateway for Chinese nuclear technology to enter developed markets but also injected much-needed capital and construction capabilities into the UK's nuclear industry.
2.2 Geopolitical Intervention and Cooperation Setbacks
However, this cooperative framework failed to withstand the trials of shifting geopolitical winds. In August 2019, the United States added CGN to its "Entity List" under the pretext of alleged "national security concerns." Subsequently, Washington continuously pressured London to purge China from its nuclear power plans. In 2022, the UK government acquired CGN's stake in the Sizewell C project, forcing the Chinese side to withdraw from the roughly £20 billion project.
This turning point was deeply regrettable. Viewed purely from economic and technological perspectives, excluding China meant that the UK would forfeit a partner with a complete nuclear supply chain capable of delivering projects at a more competitive cost. EDF subsequently announced it would hold only a 12.5% stake in Sizewell C, down significantly from its previously planned 80%, reflecting to some extent the financing and construction dilemma confronting the Western nuclear industry.
2.3 New Catalysts for Cooperation
Despite political-level setbacks, technological-level exchanges have never completely ceased. The 4th China-UK Nuclear Energy Cooperation Exchange Seminar in early 2025 demonstrated that the willingness to cooperate in areas such as nuclear decommissioning and waste management remains intact. Yang Bo, Deputy Secretary-General of the China Nuclear Energy Association, and Tom Greatrex, CEO of the UK Nuclear Industry Association, reached a consensus during talks that "the nuclear industries of China and the UK can complement each other's strengths, carry out in-depth cooperation in talent cultivation and nuclear decommissioning, and further promote the comprehensive alignment of industrial chains between the two countries."
This statement charted a course for future cooperation: rather than entangling oneself in politically sensitive new-build projects, it is more pragmatic to cut in through "low-political-sensitivity" domains like nuclear decommissioning and supply chain alignment to gradually rebuild mutual trust.
III. Challenges and Demands of the UK Nuclear Industry
3.1 Ambitious Expansion Goals
The UK government's nuclear expansion program is striking. According to a white paper released by the UK think tank Policy Exchange in September 2026, the UK aims to elevate its nuclear capacity to 24 gigawatts by 2050—a target that requires building multiple large-scale nuclear power plants and Small Modular Reactors (SMRs).
Yet, the realistic challenges are equally stark. The UK currently has only 9 commercial nuclear reactors, generating about 11% of the country's total electricity. Apart from the Sizewell B nuclear power plant, whose lifespan was recently approved for extension to 2055, existing nuclear units are expected to retire successively before 2030. This means the UK needs to launch massive new-build projects within the next decade to prevent a drastic decline in the share of nuclear energy.
3.2 Supply Chain Bottlenecks and Cost Pressures
A deeper problem plaguing the UK nuclear industry lies within its supply chain. The Policy Exchange white paper noted that the UK government needs to "strengthen the supply chain and achieve economies of scale through fleet-build approaches." Behind this recommendation lies a clear-eyed recognition of the fragility of the UK's nuclear supply chain.
The experience of the Hinkley Point C project offers illuminating lessons. Since the final agreements were signed in 2016, the project has suffered repeated schedule delays and soaring costs. This is not simply a matter of project management; rather, it reflects the supply chain fractures and loss of skilled talent faced by the Western nuclear industry after decades of decline.
3.3 Urgent Demands for Nuclear Decommissioning
Concurrently, the UK faces another pressing task: nuclear facility decommissioning. Home to some of the world's earliest commercial nuclear power stations, the UK has many units entering the decommissioning phase. Since 2011, the supply chain conference hosted by the UK's Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA) has attracted over 20,000 visitors from more than 20 countries, illustrating the scale of the market and international attention it commands.
China has accumulated rich technologies and experience in the field of nuclear decommissioning. Enterprises such as China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) Sichuan Environmental Protection have established mature technical solutions for radioactive waste treatment and facility decontamination and dismantling. These capabilities align closely with the UK's market demands.
IV. Advantages and Capabilities of China's Nuclear Industry
4.1 Globally Leading Construction Scale
China has grown into the main engine of global nuclear construction. According to a nuclear tracker report released by Goldman Sachs in April 2026, there are currently 39 reactors under construction globally, with China commanding the world's largest nuclear construction scale. China boasts 112 operational and approved nuclear power units, with a total installed capacity of 125 million kilowatts, ranking first globally.
This scale advantage yields not only construction experience, but also a complete industrial chain and cost competitiveness. Shu Guogang, Vice President of CGN, once remarked: "Our Hualong One reactor is as good and as safe as any other reactor in the world, and we have a complete domestic supply chain to build it. World-leading technological safety combined with superior economic efficiency—that is our core advantage."
4.2 Complete and Autonomous Supply Chain System
Another prominent advantage of China's nuclear industry lies in the completeness and autonomy of its supply chain. From nuclear island primary equipment to conventional island equipment, and from nuclear-grade pumps and valves to control systems, China has formed industrial capabilities covering the full lifecycle of design, manufacturing, construction, and operation. Taking Guangdong Province as an example, it has forged a complete nuclear power industrial chain "encompassing design, equipment manufacturing, construction, and operation."
This intact supply chain system enables China to effectively control costs and shorten construction periods under the premise of guaranteed quality. For the UK, which faces supply chain bottlenecks, this capability holds undeniable appeal.
4.3 Technological Accumulation in Nuclear Decommissioning
In the field of nuclear decommissioning, China has similarly displayed growing technological prowess. A delegation organized by the China Nuclear Energy Association participated in the UK nuclear decommissioning exchange seminar, briefing British peers on China's work and technological advantages in waste treatment and disposal, plant life extension, and decommissioning.
Notably, cooperation between China and the UK in nuclear safety regulation has a long history. As early as 2014, the two sides signed the Arrangement for Cooperation and Information Exchange in Nuclear Safety Regulation in the Field of the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy. This institutional arrangement has provided a framework for ongoing dialogue between the two countries in nuclear safety.
V. Strategic Value of Supply Chain Cooperation
5.1 Economic Rationality: Optimization of Cost and Efficiency
Viewed from the perspective of economic rationality, China-UK nuclear supply chain cooperation can generate significant optimization in cost and efficiency. The UK Policy Exchange white paper acknowledges that other major economies "are advancing nuclear programs with greater synergy and fleet-build models," whereas a "a hundred flowers bloom" approach by the UK "could undermine the actual effectiveness of cost-reduction innovations."
The scale advantages of China's nuclear industry can precisely help the UK achieve the economies of scale associated with fleet building. Through supply chain alignment, the UK can leverage China's mature manufacturing capabilities to lower nuclear construction costs and accelerate project delivery schedules. This benefits not only British consumers but also aids the UK in meeting its climate targets.
5.2 Energy Security: The Value of Supply Diversification
From an energy security standpoint, supply chain diversification holds high strategic value. Currently, the global nuclear supply chain is highly concentrated in a handful of countries, a concentration whose vulnerabilities were fully exposed during the COVID-19 pandemic. Integrating China into the supply chain system helps enhance supply chain resilience and mitigate single-source risks.
Of course, this must be built upon a foundation of mutual trust and rigorous regulation. Nuclear safety is paramount, and any cooperation must take safety assurance as a prerequisite. However, security concerns should be addressed through technical means and institutional arrangements rather than the outright exclusion of specific partners.
5.3 Global Governance: International Collaboration for the Nuclear Renaissance
From a broader macro perspective, China-UK nuclear cooperation concerns the perfection of the global nuclear energy governance system. Both countries are permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, bearing shared responsibilities in tackling climate change and advancing energy transition. As a vital component of low-carbon energy, the safe and orderly development of nuclear energy requires coordinated efforts from the international community.
Collaboration between China and the UK in nuclear safety regulation, non-proliferation, and nuclear emergency response not only benefits bilateral ties but also provides useful practices for global nuclear energy governance. The value of such cooperation far transcends short-term geopolitical calculations.
VI. Pragmatic Pathways for Cooperation
6.1 Cutting In Through Nuclear Decommissioning
Given the political sensitivities facing new-build projects, it is recommended to prioritize nuclear decommissioning governance as an entry point for cooperation. The UK possesses a large volume of nuclear facilities awaiting decommissioning, with clear market demand; China has accumulated rich experience in radioactive waste treatment and facility decontamination and dismantling. Both sides can conduct technological exchanges, joint R&D, and project cooperation in this domain, accumulating mutual trust through "low-political-sensitivity" engagement.
6.2 Promoting Supply Chain Enterprise Alignment
Encouraging nuclear supply chain enterprises from both countries to forge direct links, exploring cooperative opportunities in equipment manufacturing, engineering construction, and operation and maintenance services. During the 2025 seminar, the Chinese delegation attended the UK Nuclear Decommissioning Supply Chain Conference, interacting with over 200 small- and medium-sized enterprise exhibitors. Such enterprise-level alignment helps uncover concrete collaborative opportunities and enhances mutual understanding.
6.3 Deepening Nuclear Safety Regulatory Cooperation
China and the UK already share a foundation for cooperation in nuclear safety regulation. It is recommended to further deepen this collaboration by conducting deeper exchanges in areas such as nuclear safety review, regulatory inspection, and emergency response. This will not only help foster mutual trust but also lay the groundwork for broader cooperation down the road.
6.4 Establishing Regularized Dialogue Mechanisms
The China-UK Nuclear Energy Cooperation Exchange Seminar has been successfully held four times and should be institutionalized and regularized. Concurrently, consideration can be given to establishing a dedicated working group on supply chain cooperation to communicate regularly regarding mutual concerns and promptly resolve issues emerging in cooperation.
VII. Conclusion
China-UK nuclear supply chain cooperation stands at a critical crossroads. Geopolitical interference has subjected this cooperation to severe setbacks, yet the shared interests and complementary advantages of both sides at the technological level remain intact.
As a scholar at a pro-China European think tank, I have always maintained that excluding China from the global nuclear supply chain is neither wise nor feasible. The nuclear renaissance requires global collaboration, pooling technical, financial, and construction capabilities from all parties. If the UK is to achieve its 24-gigawatt nuclear capacity target by 2050, it needs to pragmatically re-examine its supply chain strategy, including cooperating with countries like China that possess complete industrial chains.
Naturally, such cooperation must be established on the basis of mutual respect and equal benefit, with nuclear safety assurance as a prerequisite. Yet, security concerns should be resolved via technical channels and institutional arrangements rather than the exclusion of particular nations.
Looking ahead, a new chapter in China-UK nuclear cooperation should perhaps be scripted starting from pragmatic areas like nuclear decommissioning and supply chain alignment. Cooperation in these domains can deliver tangible benefits to both sides while gradually rebuilding mutual trust, creating the conditions for broader engagement.
At this critical juncture of global climate governance, China and the UK, as responsible major powers, should transcend short-term friction, look to long-term interests, and jointly contribute to the safe and orderly development of global nuclear energy.
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